Biggest secret of all: Aquino’s P220 billion pork barrel
by RIGOBERTO TIGLAO
June 29, 2014
The Manila Times
In my column on Friday, I explained that behind the pork barrel furor engulfing the nation are three cover-ups managed by the Aquino administration.
The first is the fact that with the utter demonization of “pork barrel queen” Janet Lim Napoles, the Aquino government has covered up the bigger operations of a mysterious person or gang that in fact siphoned off P4 billion of taxpayers’ money into legislators’ pockets. That is practically double the P2.2 billion Napoles allegedly handled.
The second cover-up involves the fact that out of 325 House of Representatives members and 17 senators, the Justice Department, the Ombudsman’s investigators, and their stable of whistle-blowers have singled out only three senators—Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, and Ramon Revilla—leaders of the opposition, with the latter two in fact having declared that they would be running either for president or vice president in 2016.
Isn’t that way too convenient, that the barrage of charges against the two, their arrest and incarceration have painted them as crooks, two years before elections in 2016? Isn’t that too convenient, with the ratings of Mar Roxas—Aquino’s bet for 2016—slipping from about 17 percent at the start of the year to single-digit levels in recent polls, with his rival Jejomar Binay, allies of Enrile and Estrada, moving from 53 to 57 percent?
The third cover-up is the Commission on Audit’s (COA) failure, refusal, or foot-dragging in undertaking an audit of the use of funds from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) from 2010 to 2013, or during Aquino’s watch, as well as of his patently unconstitutional new form of pork, the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) funds.
The PDAF releases from 2010-2013 (already the Aquino administration) totaled P62.5 billion, double the P26.1 billion from 2007 to 2009, which is the subject of the current pork-barrel cases at the Sandiganbayan.
But these are dwarfed by the DAP, which totaled P157 billion from 2011 to 2013 according to official data from the Budget department itself (www.gov.ph/2013/10/07/qa-on-the-disbursement-acceleration-program).
That is, Aquino’s pork barrel since he assumed office amounted to P220 billion –P62.5 billion PDAF released in his first three years, plus the P157 billion DAP. Yet so far, the COA has turned a blind eye to these suspicious siphoning off of public funds committed during the term of Aquino.
COA Chairman Grace Pulido-Tan—who provided the theatrics in Napoles’ demonization by calling the use of 2007-2009 pork barrel funds as “kahindik-hindik”—must answer four questions:
• Has she issued the office directive ordering the COA’s special audits unit to undertake an audit of the PDAF from 2010-2013, and of the DAP from 2011-2013, in the rigorous manner the agency audited the funds released from 2007 to 2009? It is not just me who’s asking for an audit of the PDAF funds from 2010-2012. It was the second highest official of land, Vice President Jejomar Binay, who as early as last year, and as reported in newspapers on August 31, 2013, demanded that the auditing should not only include the years 2007 to 2009, but also the years until 2012.
• Is the Department of Budget and Management cooperating fully in providing the COA all the documents it has been asking for? (For the 2007-2009 audit, it refused to surrender all documents the COA asked for, most probably those dealing with Aquino’s allies and Liberal Party stalwarts.)
• Given the fact that such an audit of Aquino’s PDAF and DAP would clear the COA and this administration of the accusations that they are not really on an anti-corruption drive but on a campaign to bury the political opposition, has Tan deployed more auditors so the audits can be accelerated, considering the amounts involved are eight times bigger than those for 2007-2009?
• Can she promise the nation that the audit of Aquino’s pork barrel will be finished this year, and not after the 2016 elections?
Would Tan stonewall the audit of Aquino’s pork barrel as a quid pro quo for her to be appointed soon as a Supreme Court justice? We hope not.
COA must immediately audit Aquino’s pork because it involves a much larger amount of P220 billion, which is eight times the P26 billion pork for 2007-2009.
More importantly, Aquino had blatantly used the PDAF and the DAP especially in 2011 and 2012 to bribe first members of the House in filing an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Renato Corona, and then the senators to convict him.
This has been established not only by testimony of those receiving the funds (it was Jinggoy Estrada who exposed it in October 2013), but also by the timing of the funds’ releases. (See my columns: “P559 million released before Senate vote vs. Corona”, Sept. 29, 2013 and “DBM data confirms P100M ‘bribe’ to 16 senators each,” Oct 3. 2013.)
Another P4 billion was disbursed to congressmen in 2012, at P15 million each, for having filed the impeachment case against Corona.
Think about it. With Aquino bribing congressmen and senators by throwing at them millions of pesos worth of pork barrel funds, would he or his officials have tightened up procedures to make sure that the legislators don’t steal the proceeds, as they had done in 2007-2009?
Or, as rumors have circulated, was it Napoles herself and another still unidentified mastermind of the pork barrel scam who helped the legislators, with Aquino’s endorsement, to steal from the pork barrel bribe the president gave them so they’d remove Corona?
Was Napoles’ participation in the pork barrel bribes in 2011-2012 the reason for her inexplicable confidence that she would survive her current nightmare, for Aquino to personally see her in Malacañang when she surrendered in August and accompany her to the police headquarters?
Or was it an Abad-Napoles tandem in this bigger pork-barrel scam under Aquino? Note that Abad was a congressman for nine years, from 1995 to 2004, who religiously collected his pork barrel that was used for his 16,000 constituents in his tiny province of Batanes.
Especially since the COA had asked him for documents for its 2007-2009 audit, it is impossible that Abad did not know how people’s money was being stolen through the pork barrel system.
Did he advise Aquino that this is the easiest way to bribe Congress so it would remove Corona, and recommended Napoles to help out? Was it this that Napoles was really referring to when she wrote in her sworn statement that it was Abad who taught her how to use NGOs for the pork barrel scam?
For all of Aquino’s sickening blah-blahs about “walang mahirap kung walang corrupt,” did he ever talk against the pork barrel system before it was exposed in 2013?
Since he, and he alone, directed the use of the DAP, Aquino used these funds as his own personal treasury. Undeniably, Aquino’s hands are tainted with pork barrel money.
Note also COA’s wrong priorities to support Aquino’s fake anti-graft campaign.
In another move to persecute former President Arroyo as well as to pin down Napoles and the three senators, the COA undertook a special audit of P900 million of the Malampaya funds coursed in 1999 through the agrarian reform department starting in 2011.
But what may be compared to the Agrarian reform department’s Malampaya scam is the P8.6 billion—ten times the Malampaya money—Aquino gave to the ARMM from the DAP funds, purportedly to accelerate the region’s development.
And how were these distributed? Through Aquino’s hand-picked ARRM Governor Mujiv Hataman who even had a media-covered ceremony distributing P10 million in checks to officials of the region in January 2013. Aquino even complained at that event that Hataman wasn’t disbursing the funds quick enough!
For all its posturing as an anti-corruption body, the COA under Tan will be judged by history as another institution prostituted by Aquino, unless she orders the audit of this president’s P220 billion pork barrel, the biggest amount of government money ever put under a president’s sole whim in our history, and the biggest secret of all in this saga.
Friday, August 29, 2014
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
EDSA
EDSA
Ni ROLAND TOLENTINO
February 24, 2014
Bulatlat.com
Ito ang pangunahin at pinakasiksik na kalsada sa Metro Manila. Ang dating henerikong kalsada na Highway 54, ang EDSA ay ipinangalan sa bayaning si Epifanio de los Santos noong 1959. Nawala ang mga publikong espasyo at pribadong bahay, mabilisan ang transformasyon tungo sa tuloytuloy na hilera ng mga pabrika’t negosyo.
Sa simula ng Highway 54, ito ay kinatatakutan dahil sa pagiging mapanganib. Literal na highway robbery dahil walang nagpapadilim sa pagdaan dito. Pinalawak ang dating grabang pandalawahang sasakyang kalsada, naging labindalawahan. Matapos, isinalansan ang mga flyover noong panahon ni Corazon Aquino para maibsan ang trafiko.
Nakumpleto ang underpass at flyover pero nanatili ang trafiko. Isinalansan pa sa ground level ang MRT na lalong nagpasikip sa trafiko. Nakadagdag rito ang higit na nagsisiksikang malls at shopping centers na hindi nakakapagtakang nasa mga underpass at flyover, pati sa stops ng MRT.
Ang konsentrasyon ng kapital sa EDSA ay patunay na nagsasaad ng modernidad ng syudad at bansa na may koloraryong paglikha ng invisibilidad sa politikal. Ang EDSA ng pagbabago ng serye ng People Power ay naglaho na. At ang memorialisasyon ng pagdanas nito–ng isang higanteng birheng tanso sa bukana ng mall at flyover, at sa walang kalatoylatoy na tableau ng sama-samang pagkilos sa kanto naman ng military camp at exklusibong subdibisyon ng nouveau riche–ay hindi na nakakatawag-pansin sa nadanas na masibong kolektibong pagkilos ng mamamayan.
Ang memorialisasyon sa pamamamagitan ng spektakulo ng monumento, sa pagkaliblib ng ebentwal na pagtatayo ng literal na infrastruktura ng kapital (flyover, subdibisyon, mall, MRT, military camp), ay higit na nakapagpatago sa posibilidad na ang politikal ay muling mangyari. Kahit pa ang hindi napapansing mga monumento ay pagpugay sa mga awtor ng People Power–ang Katolikong simbahan sa harap ng Robinson’s, at ang natatanging si Ninoy Aquino sa foreground at ang tsuwariwap na mamamayan sa likod nito sa White Plains–ito pa rin ay sekular na memorial sa patuloy na pagpapadaloy ng kapital at depolisitisadong pagkilos sa EDSA.
Lalo pang nagsisiksikan ang EDSA ng karagdagang high-end malls at high-rise condos. Mas siksik, mas maganda. At dahil kulang na ang espasyo, walang ibang paraan para masiksik kundi paitaas. Ang kolonisasyon ng kapital sa EDSA ay nagpapahiwatig ng pananakop sa field of vision na rin nito: ang tanging natatanaw sa EDSA ay mga eksena ng kapital sa kaliwa’t kanan ng pagtunghay.
Kabilang dito ang mga higanteng tarp, ang enclosure na likha ng MRT at mga gusali ng negosyo, ang panorama ng trafiko ng mga behikulong nagsasakay ng mga manggagawa, manager at estudyante, at mga mall at condos. Ang paradox ng pagtanaw ay tila walang hanggan ang pwersa ng kapital pero mula sa statikong posisyon ng tumatanaw.
Sa literal na antas, statiko dahil nakapako o pausad-usad lang ang tumatanaw sa trapiko ng EDSA, o kung nasa MRT man, madalas sa madalang, ang mimikong pagsisiksikan ng mga pasahero sa hindi umuusad na trafiko sa ibaba. Sa figuratibong antas, statiko dahil sa dinami-rami ng dinadaanan ng biswalisasyon ng kapital–mga produkto sa mga tarp, nag-aayang mga mall at condo, magagarang sasakyan, mararangyang subdibisyon, at iba pa–ay hindi naman accessible ang tinatanaw sa tumatanaw.
Ang statikong pamamaraan ng pagkilos sa EDSA ay siya ring panuntunan sa pagdanas ng mayoryang mamamayan sa kapitalismo: sa reprodusibilidad ng pagdanas sa franchise na negosyo ng fastfood, tarp subkultura, malls at gasolinahang magtitiyak ng pagtuloy na padaloy sa tumutunghay sa iba’t ibang panig ng bansa, pati na rin ang pribatisasyon ng pagdanas sa mismong mga bahay. Tumatanaw, nakakadanas pero parating kulang o said.
Ang EDSA ng buhay ng syudad ay siya ring EDSA ng buhay ng bansa sa kapitalismo. Maraming natatanaw pero wala naman talagang tinatanaw. Lahat ng dumadaan ay overdetermined na maging sabjek ng kapital, pero hindi naman lahat ay may kapangyarihang makapamili kaya nagiging objek na lang ng kapital. Ang katawang may aksesorya ng kapital, pati ang katawang wala, ay katawang pinapadaloy ng kapital sa mismong pagpapadaloy ng kapital sa mga lansangan at sityo ng negosyo.
Kinikilabutan ako tuwing iniisip kong kailangan kong dumaan ng EDSA dahil walang katiyakan kung kailan ako makakarating at makakabalik. At may batayan naman pala ang aking pangamba. Ang EDSA ko ay EDSA na hindi ko naman inakda, inakda para sa akin para maglangkap ng pangamba at takot, at sa statikong pagkatengga sa trafiko, ang maaliw sa nakakapanghalinang imaheng namumutiktik sa kalsada. Wala akong magawa kundi tumingin, tumanaw at tumanga.
Si Roland B. Tolentino ay faculty sa UP College of Mass Communication at kasapi ng Congress of Teachers and Educators for Nationalism and Democracy (CONTEND-UP). Para sa komentaryo, maaring mag-email sa roland.tolentino@gmail.com.
Ni ROLAND TOLENTINO
February 24, 2014
Bulatlat.com
Ito ang pangunahin at pinakasiksik na kalsada sa Metro Manila. Ang dating henerikong kalsada na Highway 54, ang EDSA ay ipinangalan sa bayaning si Epifanio de los Santos noong 1959. Nawala ang mga publikong espasyo at pribadong bahay, mabilisan ang transformasyon tungo sa tuloytuloy na hilera ng mga pabrika’t negosyo.
Sa simula ng Highway 54, ito ay kinatatakutan dahil sa pagiging mapanganib. Literal na highway robbery dahil walang nagpapadilim sa pagdaan dito. Pinalawak ang dating grabang pandalawahang sasakyang kalsada, naging labindalawahan. Matapos, isinalansan ang mga flyover noong panahon ni Corazon Aquino para maibsan ang trafiko.
Nakumpleto ang underpass at flyover pero nanatili ang trafiko. Isinalansan pa sa ground level ang MRT na lalong nagpasikip sa trafiko. Nakadagdag rito ang higit na nagsisiksikang malls at shopping centers na hindi nakakapagtakang nasa mga underpass at flyover, pati sa stops ng MRT.
Ang konsentrasyon ng kapital sa EDSA ay patunay na nagsasaad ng modernidad ng syudad at bansa na may koloraryong paglikha ng invisibilidad sa politikal. Ang EDSA ng pagbabago ng serye ng People Power ay naglaho na. At ang memorialisasyon ng pagdanas nito–ng isang higanteng birheng tanso sa bukana ng mall at flyover, at sa walang kalatoylatoy na tableau ng sama-samang pagkilos sa kanto naman ng military camp at exklusibong subdibisyon ng nouveau riche–ay hindi na nakakatawag-pansin sa nadanas na masibong kolektibong pagkilos ng mamamayan.
Ang memorialisasyon sa pamamamagitan ng spektakulo ng monumento, sa pagkaliblib ng ebentwal na pagtatayo ng literal na infrastruktura ng kapital (flyover, subdibisyon, mall, MRT, military camp), ay higit na nakapagpatago sa posibilidad na ang politikal ay muling mangyari. Kahit pa ang hindi napapansing mga monumento ay pagpugay sa mga awtor ng People Power–ang Katolikong simbahan sa harap ng Robinson’s, at ang natatanging si Ninoy Aquino sa foreground at ang tsuwariwap na mamamayan sa likod nito sa White Plains–ito pa rin ay sekular na memorial sa patuloy na pagpapadaloy ng kapital at depolisitisadong pagkilos sa EDSA.
Lalo pang nagsisiksikan ang EDSA ng karagdagang high-end malls at high-rise condos. Mas siksik, mas maganda. At dahil kulang na ang espasyo, walang ibang paraan para masiksik kundi paitaas. Ang kolonisasyon ng kapital sa EDSA ay nagpapahiwatig ng pananakop sa field of vision na rin nito: ang tanging natatanaw sa EDSA ay mga eksena ng kapital sa kaliwa’t kanan ng pagtunghay.
Kabilang dito ang mga higanteng tarp, ang enclosure na likha ng MRT at mga gusali ng negosyo, ang panorama ng trafiko ng mga behikulong nagsasakay ng mga manggagawa, manager at estudyante, at mga mall at condos. Ang paradox ng pagtanaw ay tila walang hanggan ang pwersa ng kapital pero mula sa statikong posisyon ng tumatanaw.
Sa literal na antas, statiko dahil nakapako o pausad-usad lang ang tumatanaw sa trapiko ng EDSA, o kung nasa MRT man, madalas sa madalang, ang mimikong pagsisiksikan ng mga pasahero sa hindi umuusad na trafiko sa ibaba. Sa figuratibong antas, statiko dahil sa dinami-rami ng dinadaanan ng biswalisasyon ng kapital–mga produkto sa mga tarp, nag-aayang mga mall at condo, magagarang sasakyan, mararangyang subdibisyon, at iba pa–ay hindi naman accessible ang tinatanaw sa tumatanaw.
Ang statikong pamamaraan ng pagkilos sa EDSA ay siya ring panuntunan sa pagdanas ng mayoryang mamamayan sa kapitalismo: sa reprodusibilidad ng pagdanas sa franchise na negosyo ng fastfood, tarp subkultura, malls at gasolinahang magtitiyak ng pagtuloy na padaloy sa tumutunghay sa iba’t ibang panig ng bansa, pati na rin ang pribatisasyon ng pagdanas sa mismong mga bahay. Tumatanaw, nakakadanas pero parating kulang o said.
Ang EDSA ng buhay ng syudad ay siya ring EDSA ng buhay ng bansa sa kapitalismo. Maraming natatanaw pero wala naman talagang tinatanaw. Lahat ng dumadaan ay overdetermined na maging sabjek ng kapital, pero hindi naman lahat ay may kapangyarihang makapamili kaya nagiging objek na lang ng kapital. Ang katawang may aksesorya ng kapital, pati ang katawang wala, ay katawang pinapadaloy ng kapital sa mismong pagpapadaloy ng kapital sa mga lansangan at sityo ng negosyo.
Kinikilabutan ako tuwing iniisip kong kailangan kong dumaan ng EDSA dahil walang katiyakan kung kailan ako makakarating at makakabalik. At may batayan naman pala ang aking pangamba. Ang EDSA ko ay EDSA na hindi ko naman inakda, inakda para sa akin para maglangkap ng pangamba at takot, at sa statikong pagkatengga sa trafiko, ang maaliw sa nakakapanghalinang imaheng namumutiktik sa kalsada. Wala akong magawa kundi tumingin, tumanaw at tumanga.
Si Roland B. Tolentino ay faculty sa UP College of Mass Communication at kasapi ng Congress of Teachers and Educators for Nationalism and Democracy (CONTEND-UP). Para sa komentaryo, maaring mag-email sa roland.tolentino@gmail.com.
Thursday, August 15, 2013
Beyond internet activism
Beyond internet activism
By Mong Palatino
August 8, 2013
Bulatlat.com
The opposite of internet activism is not street activism but no-activism. Online petitions and political hashtags are indispensable in the campaign for change while non-action is a convenient option that only serves the interest of status quo.
Internet activism is sometimes equated with impotence but at least it exists. There are no TV activists and newspaper activists but there are internet activists. Why is this so? Because corporate ownership of mainstream media has made it impossible for the people to dictate the agenda in major media networks. Meanwhile, the internet has become truly social by allowing the people to create and exchange cyber tools that can be used for political purposes.
We are still in the stage of experimentation on how the internet can be redirected and reshaped to serve the community. Various forces are still competing for dominance in the online world at a time when corporate conglomerates and government bodies are not yet able to impose an absolute hegemony on how we use and practice the potential of the internet technology.
Indeed, because of intensified militarization and commodification, the internet has become a more dangerous place than ever where the space for independent thought and practice is under threat. But since total government regulation is still unenforceable at the moment, this technology should not be easily surrendered to the enemy. The internet-plus-activism equation must be continually pursued.
And the undeniable fact is that among the most resolute and creative practitioners of internet activism in the country are the militant activists of the parliament of the streets. They have been consistently maximizing the most effective social media tools to promote their causes and recruit members. They have successfully initiated several campaigns that combine the offline and online to make a greater political impact such as the text jokes at the height of Edsa Dos, Hello Garci ringtones, and disappearing Facebook profiles. Activists are as tech-savvy as they are often caricatured to be grim and determined. Connecting, networking, collaborating, crowdsourcing – these are actually popular keywords of traditional activism.
Internet activism became a real reality not because activists have stopped shouting and marching in the streets in order to join the so-called virtual rallies in wired world. On the contrary, activists continued to ‘occupy’ the streets while they actively shared apps and status updates online. In other words, offline activism is inevitably online as well. This is internet activism. This is activism in the 21st century.
But what separates activists from internet worshippers is the belief of the former that what really matters in the end is the political empowerment of the people. And to do this, the grassroots must learn to struggle and fight for broader political goals. They must organize not just their inbox but the whole society.
Unfortunately, there are self-proclaimed internet activists who also claim to empower the citizens but emphatically reject politics. They simply want the magic of IT to deliver the message minus the radical threat of politics. They aim to restrict the scope of internet activism by focusing on issues that can be accommodated by mainstream media. Their political strategy consists of dismissing street politics and depoliticizing the content of internet activism, or what is left of it. They engage in infinite conversations about peripheral social issues, or political concerns that do not address the roots of injustice and inequality in society. They gossip about the lifestyle of the rich, they ridicule the poor, and they assuage their guilt by lampooning corrupt politicians and shady public characters.
This brand of internet activism is embraced by closet conservatives, pseudo-reformists, and even by politicians who pretend to be social media enthusiasts.
Politics-less internet activism, not internet activism, is the problem that must be dealt with decisively. The challenge should not be simply about exhorting the netizens to support the masses but to restore politics proper in online activism.
What’s the use of persuading a Twitter user to attend an offline event organized by the state to distract the attention of the public and weaken the fighting enthusiasm of the online citizens? There is little to celebrate if netizens turned off their gadgets and integrated in the communities just so that they can spread the doctrine of cash transfers and self-demolition. This is activism that disempowers the poor and it should be outrightly rejected.
Internet activism must remain political, subversive or revolutionary even. If necessary, it must not be afraid to cut links with corporate sponsors, state functionaries, and knowledge-producing institutions to promote digital democracy. It must aggressively espouse the truth even if it would disrupt the comforts of the networks and even if it would contradict popular opinion. Otherwise, it would degenerate into a useless but arrogant drone.
Mong Palatino is an activist, blogger, and representative of Kabataan (Youth) Partylist in the 14th and 15th Congress of the Philippines. He is the Philippines’ first blogger turned legislator and the first elected youth representative in the legislative body. As a student leader, he chaired the UP Diliman University Student Council in 2000 and was national president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines in 2001. He was former news editor of Yehey.com, a leading local web portal and columnist for UPIAsia.com from 2007-2009. He is currently the regional editor for Southeast Asia of Global Voices Online, a pioneering social media platform. He also writes a political column for the ASEAN Beat of The Diplomat web magazine. His column “Question Everything” will appear weekly at Bulatlat.com
By Mong Palatino
August 8, 2013
Bulatlat.com
The opposite of internet activism is not street activism but no-activism. Online petitions and political hashtags are indispensable in the campaign for change while non-action is a convenient option that only serves the interest of status quo.
Internet activism is sometimes equated with impotence but at least it exists. There are no TV activists and newspaper activists but there are internet activists. Why is this so? Because corporate ownership of mainstream media has made it impossible for the people to dictate the agenda in major media networks. Meanwhile, the internet has become truly social by allowing the people to create and exchange cyber tools that can be used for political purposes.
We are still in the stage of experimentation on how the internet can be redirected and reshaped to serve the community. Various forces are still competing for dominance in the online world at a time when corporate conglomerates and government bodies are not yet able to impose an absolute hegemony on how we use and practice the potential of the internet technology.
Indeed, because of intensified militarization and commodification, the internet has become a more dangerous place than ever where the space for independent thought and practice is under threat. But since total government regulation is still unenforceable at the moment, this technology should not be easily surrendered to the enemy. The internet-plus-activism equation must be continually pursued.
And the undeniable fact is that among the most resolute and creative practitioners of internet activism in the country are the militant activists of the parliament of the streets. They have been consistently maximizing the most effective social media tools to promote their causes and recruit members. They have successfully initiated several campaigns that combine the offline and online to make a greater political impact such as the text jokes at the height of Edsa Dos, Hello Garci ringtones, and disappearing Facebook profiles. Activists are as tech-savvy as they are often caricatured to be grim and determined. Connecting, networking, collaborating, crowdsourcing – these are actually popular keywords of traditional activism.
Internet activism became a real reality not because activists have stopped shouting and marching in the streets in order to join the so-called virtual rallies in wired world. On the contrary, activists continued to ‘occupy’ the streets while they actively shared apps and status updates online. In other words, offline activism is inevitably online as well. This is internet activism. This is activism in the 21st century.
But what separates activists from internet worshippers is the belief of the former that what really matters in the end is the political empowerment of the people. And to do this, the grassroots must learn to struggle and fight for broader political goals. They must organize not just their inbox but the whole society.
Unfortunately, there are self-proclaimed internet activists who also claim to empower the citizens but emphatically reject politics. They simply want the magic of IT to deliver the message minus the radical threat of politics. They aim to restrict the scope of internet activism by focusing on issues that can be accommodated by mainstream media. Their political strategy consists of dismissing street politics and depoliticizing the content of internet activism, or what is left of it. They engage in infinite conversations about peripheral social issues, or political concerns that do not address the roots of injustice and inequality in society. They gossip about the lifestyle of the rich, they ridicule the poor, and they assuage their guilt by lampooning corrupt politicians and shady public characters.
This brand of internet activism is embraced by closet conservatives, pseudo-reformists, and even by politicians who pretend to be social media enthusiasts.
Politics-less internet activism, not internet activism, is the problem that must be dealt with decisively. The challenge should not be simply about exhorting the netizens to support the masses but to restore politics proper in online activism.
What’s the use of persuading a Twitter user to attend an offline event organized by the state to distract the attention of the public and weaken the fighting enthusiasm of the online citizens? There is little to celebrate if netizens turned off their gadgets and integrated in the communities just so that they can spread the doctrine of cash transfers and self-demolition. This is activism that disempowers the poor and it should be outrightly rejected.
Internet activism must remain political, subversive or revolutionary even. If necessary, it must not be afraid to cut links with corporate sponsors, state functionaries, and knowledge-producing institutions to promote digital democracy. It must aggressively espouse the truth even if it would disrupt the comforts of the networks and even if it would contradict popular opinion. Otherwise, it would degenerate into a useless but arrogant drone.
Mong Palatino is an activist, blogger, and representative of Kabataan (Youth) Partylist in the 14th and 15th Congress of the Philippines. He is the Philippines’ first blogger turned legislator and the first elected youth representative in the legislative body. As a student leader, he chaired the UP Diliman University Student Council in 2000 and was national president of the National Union of Students of the Philippines in 2001. He was former news editor of Yehey.com, a leading local web portal and columnist for UPIAsia.com from 2007-2009. He is currently the regional editor for Southeast Asia of Global Voices Online, a pioneering social media platform. He also writes a political column for the ASEAN Beat of The Diplomat web magazine. His column “Question Everything” will appear weekly at Bulatlat.com
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
Cacique diplomacy
Cacique diplomacy
March 12, 2013
By Carol Pagaduan-Araullo
Bulatlat.com
Why is it taking forever for Malacanang to state whether it acknowledges the official claim of the Philippines to Sabah and will pursue it with vigor or will drop it like a hot potato?
Many are beginning to surmise that the Aquino regime is not all convinced that the Sabah claim has merit and his description of it as a “hopeless cause” is not just a slip of the tongue indicating “ignorance or incompetence” as Sultan Jamalul Kiram III suspects but his regime’s point of view and even policy on the matter.
The objective of the so-called study ordered by Mr. Aquino appears to be to find holes in the claim rather than determine its veracity and validity. Otherwise, why has the “study” not come up with anything at all so far? Surely the DFA and other government agencies can dig up the documentation on the Philippines’ Sabah claim whilst Mr. Aquino consults the many experts that have specialized in scholarly, legal and historical, study of the same.
The Aquino regime’s indifference to the Philippines’ Sabah claim underlies his 1) disdain over Sultanate’s political act of asserting their claim of ownership; 2) belief that this is merely part of a grand conspiracy by his political enemies to make trouble, in particular to throw a monkey wrench into the GPH-MILF peace negotiations; 3) refusal to negotiate in earnest with the Sultanate’s heirs instead resorting to publicly-aired ultimatums and threats of criminal prosecution against Sultan Kiram III and other “co-conspirators”; 4) speaking and acting as if he fully concedes Malaysia’s sovereignty over Sabah, that is, the Sultanate’s unarmed followers and members of its “Royal Security Forces” are the transgressors and the Malaysian government is justified in using all-out force to exterminate them.
Too bad for Mr. Aquino it is not going to be easy to rewrite the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history with regard to North Borneo now Sabah.
The facts are clear and incontrovertible. The Sulu Sultanate came to own and rule over North Borneo in 1704 when the Sulu Sultan’s relative, the Sultan of Brunei, granted the territory to the former in return for helping him quell his enemies.
In 1878, the Sulu Sultanate entered into a lease agreement with the British North Borneo Company, a private trading company; for a consideration of 5000 Malayan dollars per year, the BNBC could exploit and develop North Borneo’s natural resources and administer the territory in the Sultanate’s behalf. This was upped to 5300 dollars in 1903 when Sultan Jamalul Kiram II signed a document leasing additional islands in the vicinity of the mainland of North Borneo.
Subsequently, the British Crown in collusion with the BNBC deliberately misinterpreted the term “padyak” in the 1878 agreement to mean “cession” instead of “lease” in order for the British to land grab North Borneo and falsely claim dominion or sovereignty over it.
The Sulu Sultanate came under the control of Spain in the 1880s but not North Borneo. The 1885 Madrid Protocol signed by Great Britain, Germany and Spain consolidated Spain’s continued sway over the Philippine islands while Spain renounced all claims of sovereignty over the territories of Borneo belonging to the Sultan of Sulu.
The United States officially notified Great Britain that North Borneo remained part of the Sulu Sultanate in 1906 and 1920; nevertheless, Britain proceeded to annex North Borneo as a colony in 1946.
The 1935 Constitution defined Philippine territory to include “all other areas which belong to the Philippines on the basis of historical rights and legal claims” and thus effectively covered North Borneo. The Sulu Sultanate’s act of ceding sovereignty to the Republic of the Philippines on 12 September 1962, during the Diosdado Macapagal administration authorized the Philippine government to file the Sabah claim with the United Nations and other international forums.
The so-called plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the British colonialists and their Malayan subalterns in 1963 predictably resulted in a vote in favor of Sabah’s incorporation in the Federation of Malaysia. And so it came to pass that when Malaysia was formed in 1963, Britain’s illegal annexation of North Borneo was bequeathed to the new Malaysian state.
It is evident from the above that the Philippines has a solid claim to sovereignty over Sabah, to say the least. What is incomprehensible to many is why Presidents Macapagal and Marcos, who showed some interest in pursuing the claim at the beginning of their terms, eventually backed off. Successive regimes after Marcos chose to let the claim lie dormant, with Ramos and Estrada ordering “studies” on the bases and prospects for pursuing the claims, without any concrete or at least announced results.
The answer lies in the fact that the Philippine government’s foreign policy is still very much aligned with and influenced, if not dictated by US foreign policy and national interest. Thus, attempts to explain various regimes’ position on Sabah purely on the basis or in the context of Philippine national interest prove inadequate. Oftentimes, what is good for the US is misrepresented as good for the Philippines, too, especially on questions of “regional peace and stability”. What the US says is good for “regional peace and stability”, is good for the Philippines too.
With respect to Sabah, Philippine regimes invariably relegated the Philippine claim to the back burner to avoid confrontation with Malaysia or even antagonizing it in any way. Especially so since 1974 when Malaysia started playing a key role in the Organization of Islamic Conference’s intervention in the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF, and more so since 2001 when Malaysia became the official Third Party Facilitator in the GPH-MILF talks.
This partly explains why Aquino, more than his predecessors, evidently has no interest in supporting the Kirams in renewing the Philippines’ claim to Sabah. As the Framework Agreement nears completion with most of the annexes agreed upon by the GPH and MILF panels, this is not the best time to incur the displeasure, if not ire, of the Third Party Facilitator, Malaysia. At the very least, it would appear to be an unpardonable act of ingratitude. At worst, Malaysia could retaliate and put the agreement in peril.
But this does not explain why Aquino has gone a lot farther to the extent of clearly siding with Malaysia. Not only has Aquino refused to acknowledge the peaceful intent of the Sultanate’s expedition to Sabah he has desisted from supporting the Kirams’ mostly symbolic and political move. He has threatened them with arrest and prosecution, broadcast his supposed doubts on the legitimacy even of their royal lineage, and practically accuses them of acting only at the behest of and in conspiracy with the much discredited Arroyos.
Mr. Aquino had virtually given the Malaysian government the green light to use coercive and armed means to end the stand-off and crush the Filipinos.
To top it all, Mr. Aquino has chosen to do a Pontius Pilate, washing his hands of the bloody outcome of his regime’s hard-line position against the Kirams. He has since relegated the handling of the Sabah crisis to his underlings while he blithely campaigns for his senatorial candidates and indulges in pontificating about the Sultan’s culpability for the ignominious end of his followers in Sabah.
Many who are still trying to understand the actuation and statements of Mr. Aquino with the assumption that his standpoint derives from the national interest are bound to be stumped and confused forever. In truth, Mr. Aquino’s derisive attitude can only be traced to his cacique upbringing and mindset.
Mr. Aquino, scion of landed elites and heir to the Cojuangco-Aquino political dynasty, can readily sympathize with the land grab of North Borneo perpetrated by the Malaysian state and ruling elite, because this is something he can relate to in light of the experience of the clan’s Hacienda Luisita. He is dealing with the Kirams in much the same way he and his clan has dealt with the Hacienda’s farm workers and tenants for decades – using deceit and force – to maintain an unjust status quo. #
Published in Business World
8-9 March 2013
March 12, 2013
By Carol Pagaduan-Araullo
Bulatlat.com
Why is it taking forever for Malacanang to state whether it acknowledges the official claim of the Philippines to Sabah and will pursue it with vigor or will drop it like a hot potato?
Many are beginning to surmise that the Aquino regime is not all convinced that the Sabah claim has merit and his description of it as a “hopeless cause” is not just a slip of the tongue indicating “ignorance or incompetence” as Sultan Jamalul Kiram III suspects but his regime’s point of view and even policy on the matter.
The objective of the so-called study ordered by Mr. Aquino appears to be to find holes in the claim rather than determine its veracity and validity. Otherwise, why has the “study” not come up with anything at all so far? Surely the DFA and other government agencies can dig up the documentation on the Philippines’ Sabah claim whilst Mr. Aquino consults the many experts that have specialized in scholarly, legal and historical, study of the same.
The Aquino regime’s indifference to the Philippines’ Sabah claim underlies his 1) disdain over Sultanate’s political act of asserting their claim of ownership; 2) belief that this is merely part of a grand conspiracy by his political enemies to make trouble, in particular to throw a monkey wrench into the GPH-MILF peace negotiations; 3) refusal to negotiate in earnest with the Sultanate’s heirs instead resorting to publicly-aired ultimatums and threats of criminal prosecution against Sultan Kiram III and other “co-conspirators”; 4) speaking and acting as if he fully concedes Malaysia’s sovereignty over Sabah, that is, the Sultanate’s unarmed followers and members of its “Royal Security Forces” are the transgressors and the Malaysian government is justified in using all-out force to exterminate them.
Too bad for Mr. Aquino it is not going to be easy to rewrite the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial history with regard to North Borneo now Sabah.
The facts are clear and incontrovertible. The Sulu Sultanate came to own and rule over North Borneo in 1704 when the Sulu Sultan’s relative, the Sultan of Brunei, granted the territory to the former in return for helping him quell his enemies.
In 1878, the Sulu Sultanate entered into a lease agreement with the British North Borneo Company, a private trading company; for a consideration of 5000 Malayan dollars per year, the BNBC could exploit and develop North Borneo’s natural resources and administer the territory in the Sultanate’s behalf. This was upped to 5300 dollars in 1903 when Sultan Jamalul Kiram II signed a document leasing additional islands in the vicinity of the mainland of North Borneo.
Subsequently, the British Crown in collusion with the BNBC deliberately misinterpreted the term “padyak” in the 1878 agreement to mean “cession” instead of “lease” in order for the British to land grab North Borneo and falsely claim dominion or sovereignty over it.
The Sulu Sultanate came under the control of Spain in the 1880s but not North Borneo. The 1885 Madrid Protocol signed by Great Britain, Germany and Spain consolidated Spain’s continued sway over the Philippine islands while Spain renounced all claims of sovereignty over the territories of Borneo belonging to the Sultan of Sulu.
The United States officially notified Great Britain that North Borneo remained part of the Sulu Sultanate in 1906 and 1920; nevertheless, Britain proceeded to annex North Borneo as a colony in 1946.
The 1935 Constitution defined Philippine territory to include “all other areas which belong to the Philippines on the basis of historical rights and legal claims” and thus effectively covered North Borneo. The Sulu Sultanate’s act of ceding sovereignty to the Republic of the Philippines on 12 September 1962, during the Diosdado Macapagal administration authorized the Philippine government to file the Sabah claim with the United Nations and other international forums.
The so-called plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the British colonialists and their Malayan subalterns in 1963 predictably resulted in a vote in favor of Sabah’s incorporation in the Federation of Malaysia. And so it came to pass that when Malaysia was formed in 1963, Britain’s illegal annexation of North Borneo was bequeathed to the new Malaysian state.
It is evident from the above that the Philippines has a solid claim to sovereignty over Sabah, to say the least. What is incomprehensible to many is why Presidents Macapagal and Marcos, who showed some interest in pursuing the claim at the beginning of their terms, eventually backed off. Successive regimes after Marcos chose to let the claim lie dormant, with Ramos and Estrada ordering “studies” on the bases and prospects for pursuing the claims, without any concrete or at least announced results.
The answer lies in the fact that the Philippine government’s foreign policy is still very much aligned with and influenced, if not dictated by US foreign policy and national interest. Thus, attempts to explain various regimes’ position on Sabah purely on the basis or in the context of Philippine national interest prove inadequate. Oftentimes, what is good for the US is misrepresented as good for the Philippines, too, especially on questions of “regional peace and stability”. What the US says is good for “regional peace and stability”, is good for the Philippines too.
With respect to Sabah, Philippine regimes invariably relegated the Philippine claim to the back burner to avoid confrontation with Malaysia or even antagonizing it in any way. Especially so since 1974 when Malaysia started playing a key role in the Organization of Islamic Conference’s intervention in the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF, and more so since 2001 when Malaysia became the official Third Party Facilitator in the GPH-MILF talks.
This partly explains why Aquino, more than his predecessors, evidently has no interest in supporting the Kirams in renewing the Philippines’ claim to Sabah. As the Framework Agreement nears completion with most of the annexes agreed upon by the GPH and MILF panels, this is not the best time to incur the displeasure, if not ire, of the Third Party Facilitator, Malaysia. At the very least, it would appear to be an unpardonable act of ingratitude. At worst, Malaysia could retaliate and put the agreement in peril.
But this does not explain why Aquino has gone a lot farther to the extent of clearly siding with Malaysia. Not only has Aquino refused to acknowledge the peaceful intent of the Sultanate’s expedition to Sabah he has desisted from supporting the Kirams’ mostly symbolic and political move. He has threatened them with arrest and prosecution, broadcast his supposed doubts on the legitimacy even of their royal lineage, and practically accuses them of acting only at the behest of and in conspiracy with the much discredited Arroyos.
Mr. Aquino had virtually given the Malaysian government the green light to use coercive and armed means to end the stand-off and crush the Filipinos.
To top it all, Mr. Aquino has chosen to do a Pontius Pilate, washing his hands of the bloody outcome of his regime’s hard-line position against the Kirams. He has since relegated the handling of the Sabah crisis to his underlings while he blithely campaigns for his senatorial candidates and indulges in pontificating about the Sultan’s culpability for the ignominious end of his followers in Sabah.
Many who are still trying to understand the actuation and statements of Mr. Aquino with the assumption that his standpoint derives from the national interest are bound to be stumped and confused forever. In truth, Mr. Aquino’s derisive attitude can only be traced to his cacique upbringing and mindset.
Mr. Aquino, scion of landed elites and heir to the Cojuangco-Aquino political dynasty, can readily sympathize with the land grab of North Borneo perpetrated by the Malaysian state and ruling elite, because this is something he can relate to in light of the experience of the clan’s Hacienda Luisita. He is dealing with the Kirams in much the same way he and his clan has dealt with the Hacienda’s farm workers and tenants for decades – using deceit and force – to maintain an unjust status quo. #
Published in Business World
8-9 March 2013
Tuesday, February 12, 2013
The Philippines between two greedy giants
An Interview
The Philippines between two greedy giants
January 22, 2013
Interview with Prof. Jose Maria Sison
Founding Chairman, Communist Party of the Philippines
By John Toledo
Features Editor, Philippine Collegian
Prof. Jose Maria Sison (JMS): Let us first put into context what you refer to as the West Philippine Sea. The Spratlys are a group of 250 islets plus the shoals and reefs spread over 265,542 square kilometers. They are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan and Vietnam and in part by Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The part of the Spratlys claimed by the Phiippines is what it calls the Kalayaan group of islets located in the West Philippine Sea.
China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim ownership of all the Spratlys supposedly since ancient times on the basis of historical references, seasonal visits by their fishermen and assertions of claims against colonizers as well as yielding of the Spratlys by the Japanese to the French and thus to Vietnam in the San Francisco peace treaty after World War II. Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines claim parts of the Spratlys that are geographically closest to them and within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) plus prehistorical and historical claims that the islets concerned have long been the fishing grounds of their respective fishermen.
China arrogantly claims not only the entire Spratlys but also the entire sea south and east of China as its property and by making military shows of strength to assert its claims. But the Kalayaan group of islets, the Recto (Reed ) and Panatag Shoal (Scarborough) are all within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines under the UNCLOS. It is wrong for China to claim these.
In economic terms, the contested islets and shoals and the waters around them are at least rich fishing grounds and sources of corals but they also have a high potential as sources of gas and oil. The Recto Bank is well known for having rich gas and oil deposits as a result of explorations. In political and military terms, the contested islets and shoals can serve as outposts for military vessels and for controlling navigation and commerce or evoking power and influence.
The US is fishing in troubled waters. As a matter of fact, it is responsible for stirring up trouble in the first place. It has undertaken controlled trouble-making just to make the Philippine reactionary puppet government run to it for support, to have the reason for entrenching US military forces in the Philippines and to have the Philippines as a base for influencing policies and development within China. The US has strategic objectives in using the Philippines as a strategic base in the US encirclement of China.
China will not wage war on the Philippines but it will continue to take calculated actions, including shows of force, to discourage and prevent Philippine attempts to control and occupy the contested islets and develop the gas and oil resources there. Neither will the US wage war with China to support the Philippines in the territorial dispute. It has far more economic and political interests in good relations with China than in those with the Philippines.
The US has repeatedly proclaimed that it is neutral in the territorial dispute between China and Philippines. The most it can say is that it is militarily entrenching itself in the Philippines in order to discourage China from attacking the Philippines. However, it will not act militarily against the calculated military moves of China to prevent Philippine attempts to explore and develop the gas and oil resources in the contested islets and shoals.
But China and the US might even make a deal to exploit the gas and oil resources for the benefit of US and Chinese corporations and some big comprador Filipino-Chinese firms or the Indonesian-Chinese firm (Salim group) being managed by Manuel V. Pangilinan. The whole world knows that the mineral ores of the Philippines are being wantonly excavated by US, Japanese, Canadian, Australian, Swiss, Chinese and other foreign firms, together with their big comprador allies. And China has been a major destination of the mineral ores.
In an attempt to look nationalist, the US-Aquino regime is obviously play-acting against China over the well-hyped territorial disputes. It is well within the bounds of the collaboration between the US and China. The US is steering the Philippine government towards the attainment of the narrow self-interest and strategic objectives of the US.
One more reason why the US is entrenching itself militarily in the Philippines and using this as part of the US encirclement of China is not to wage war soon but to influence policies and developments in China. The US is trying to realize the complete privatization of the most strategic state-owned enterprises in China and to promote the liberalization of Chinese politics to the point of doing away with the authoritarian rule and causing the weakening or even disintegration of the bureaucrat monopoly capitalism.
What is tragic about the Philippine ruling system of big compradors and landlords is that it is weak and servile to imperialist powers and that both the US and China take advantage of the Philippines. The US pretends to protect the Philippines but it is a bantay salakay. Having long become a capitalist country, China cannot be expected to be a gentle and generous giant.
The Filipino people can best assert their national sovereignty and defend their territorial integrity by overthrowing the ruling system and establishing a people´s democratic state that is truly independent and democratic, determined to carry out land reform and industrialization, realizes social justice and aims for socialism. Such a state is capable of using effective diplomacy and defending its territory against intruders. ###
The Philippines between two greedy giants
January 22, 2013
Interview with Prof. Jose Maria Sison
Founding Chairman, Communist Party of the Philippines
By John Toledo
Features Editor, Philippine Collegian
1. Historically, who are the original claimants of the West Philippine Sea? Where did this dispute come from? Who are the claimants today?
Prof. Jose Maria Sison (JMS): Let us first put into context what you refer to as the West Philippine Sea. The Spratlys are a group of 250 islets plus the shoals and reefs spread over 265,542 square kilometers. They are claimed entirely by China, Taiwan and Vietnam and in part by Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. The part of the Spratlys claimed by the Phiippines is what it calls the Kalayaan group of islets located in the West Philippine Sea.
China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim ownership of all the Spratlys supposedly since ancient times on the basis of historical references, seasonal visits by their fishermen and assertions of claims against colonizers as well as yielding of the Spratlys by the Japanese to the French and thus to Vietnam in the San Francisco peace treaty after World War II. Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines claim parts of the Spratlys that are geographically closest to them and within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) plus prehistorical and historical claims that the islets concerned have long been the fishing grounds of their respective fishermen.
2. Why is the West Philippine Sea being claimed by China and Philippines? Is it economically and politically useful? Why or why not?
China arrogantly claims not only the entire Spratlys but also the entire sea south and east of China as its property and by making military shows of strength to assert its claims. But the Kalayaan group of islets, the Recto (Reed ) and Panatag Shoal (Scarborough) are all within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines under the UNCLOS. It is wrong for China to claim these.
In economic terms, the contested islets and shoals and the waters around them are at least rich fishing grounds and sources of corals but they also have a high potential as sources of gas and oil. The Recto Bank is well known for having rich gas and oil deposits as a result of explorations. In political and military terms, the contested islets and shoals can serve as outposts for military vessels and for controlling navigation and commerce or evoking power and influence.
3. Why is US joining in the conflict? Why is it strategic for US to support the Philippines with many armed forces and materials?
The US is fishing in troubled waters. As a matter of fact, it is responsible for stirring up trouble in the first place. It has undertaken controlled trouble-making just to make the Philippine reactionary puppet government run to it for support, to have the reason for entrenching US military forces in the Philippines and to have the Philippines as a base for influencing policies and development within China. The US has strategic objectives in using the Philippines as a strategic base in the US encirclement of China.
4. Is it logically possible that China will wage war on the Philippines because of this West Philippine Sea dispute? Or is it just a ploy for US to wage war with China? Why or why not?
China will not wage war on the Philippines but it will continue to take calculated actions, including shows of force, to discourage and prevent Philippine attempts to control and occupy the contested islets and develop the gas and oil resources there. Neither will the US wage war with China to support the Philippines in the territorial dispute. It has far more economic and political interests in good relations with China than in those with the Philippines.
The US has repeatedly proclaimed that it is neutral in the territorial dispute between China and Philippines. The most it can say is that it is militarily entrenching itself in the Philippines in order to discourage China from attacking the Philippines. However, it will not act militarily against the calculated military moves of China to prevent Philippine attempts to explore and develop the gas and oil resources in the contested islets and shoals.
But China and the US might even make a deal to exploit the gas and oil resources for the benefit of US and Chinese corporations and some big comprador Filipino-Chinese firms or the Indonesian-Chinese firm (Salim group) being managed by Manuel V. Pangilinan. The whole world knows that the mineral ores of the Philippines are being wantonly excavated by US, Japanese, Canadian, Australian, Swiss, Chinese and other foreign firms, together with their big comprador allies. And China has been a major destination of the mineral ores.
In an attempt to look nationalist, the US-Aquino regime is obviously play-acting against China over the well-hyped territorial disputes. It is well within the bounds of the collaboration between the US and China. The US is steering the Philippine government towards the attainment of the narrow self-interest and strategic objectives of the US.
One more reason why the US is entrenching itself militarily in the Philippines and using this as part of the US encirclement of China is not to wage war soon but to influence policies and developments in China. The US is trying to realize the complete privatization of the most strategic state-owned enterprises in China and to promote the liberalization of Chinese politics to the point of doing away with the authoritarian rule and causing the weakening or even disintegration of the bureaucrat monopoly capitalism.
5. What are the implications of the Sino-Philippine territorial dispute in relation to the sovereignty of the Philippines?
What is tragic about the Philippine ruling system of big compradors and landlords is that it is weak and servile to imperialist powers and that both the US and China take advantage of the Philippines. The US pretends to protect the Philippines but it is a bantay salakay. Having long become a capitalist country, China cannot be expected to be a gentle and generous giant.
The Filipino people can best assert their national sovereignty and defend their territorial integrity by overthrowing the ruling system and establishing a people´s democratic state that is truly independent and democratic, determined to carry out land reform and industrialization, realizes social justice and aims for socialism. Such a state is capable of using effective diplomacy and defending its territory against intruders. ###
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